The paper develops a model of academic tenure based on multi-tasking and screening. A professor has two tasks, researching and teaching. We assume that researching performance is easy to measure but teaching performance is immeasurable. Then Holmtrom and Milgrom's (1991) classical muli-task principal-agent model implies that the only way for the the university to "incentivize"teaching activity is decreasing the incentive power to researching activity. This justi…es the low-powered contract to tenured professors. However, with low-powered contract, the university will face serious informational problem in the process of enrollment, either transferring rents to the candidates with low ability if the wage level is high, or su¤ering from the potential occupational vacancy if the wage level is low. To this dilemma, the up-or-out contract is a possible solution.
Introduction
Compared to other organizations, modern universities are characteristic of its tenure system, under which the tenured professors usually earn performanceindependent wage, and can not be …red unless they have serious moral problems. It is quite strange given that economics emphasizes the fundamental role of incentive for e¢ ciency. The way that the tenure position is granted is also varied. Usually, a well-established senior scholar is o¤ered a tenure position directly while a junior with uncertain academic prospect has to experience a probationary period, by the end of which he will obtain tenure position if he has met a predetermined academic criterion and will be …red otherwise.
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Academic tenure system since its advent has always been controversy and under heated debate. Advocates consider it to be extremely necessary for protecting academic freedom and original innovations, as articulated in "1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure" by American Association of University Professors (AAUP). However, opponents contend that tenure system, depriving the universities of the right to …re their employees, has spawned plenty of "lazy professors" with low academic productivity or some eccentric professors who only care about own academic interests while overlooking the important practical needs. Because …scal patronage is the important …nan-cial sources for the universities (even the private ones), tenure system should be abolished to save public resource waste.
Despite the strong oppositions, one stunning phenomenon is that many universities whether public or private have adopted the tenure system "voluntarily". Since the private universities, in principle, have the right to reject it, simple revealed preference argument show that the universities are the very bene…ciary from this system. Any institution, once established, will evolve in its inherent logic which may be quite di¤erent from it its historical origin. So, besides protecting academic freedom, are there other rationales for tenure system? Freeman (1977) o¤ers a risk-sharing explanation. He emphasizes the potential tension between the facts that researching activities are in essence highly risky on the one hand and that the researchers are usually risk-averse on the other hand. In his opinion, the combination of tenure system and minimum wage policy is a risk-sharing mechanism encouraging risk-averse researcher to do the risky but socially bene…cial research projects. Furthermore, Mcpherson and Whinston (1999) argue that scienti…c progress necessitates knowledge specialization with which, however, the researchers risk being stranded. For example, a researcher highly specialized in one frontier …eld might not be rightly understood and evaluated by other colleagues, especially in short term. This implies that, without enough occupational protection, risk-averse researcher will have insu¢ cient incentive to specialize, which in turn retards scienti…c progress. Plausible as an explanation to tenure system, the risk-sharing argument begs the question why one rarely observes all life employment (as counterpart of tenure system in universities) in industries where technological progress is also characteristic of risk and specialization. Maybe, law bar is a special case. Siow (1998) argues that tenure system may help improve the social e¢ ciency of a researcher allocating his time on teaching and research in life cycle. Teaching productivity is assume to be irrelevant to age while research productivity has an inverse-U-shaped relationship in age, …rst increasing, then peaking and …nally decreasing. Under this assumption, a professor should spend more time on teaching as his age increases. However, insofar as only academic publications can be observed by other universities as potential competing employers, the professors will exert excessive e¤ort on research in order to have a better outside option as a credible threat to quit in the bargaining process with his current employer for a better compensation. Siow suggests that tenure system helps alleviate the ine¢ ciency. The reason is as follows: Only when a professor has well accomplished the tasks, will the current employer have incentive to match the outside bid increasing the compensation for the professor. In our opinion, this explanation faces a problem of credibility. The fact that the professor has well accomplished the tasks in the past does not imply it is still the case in the future. Carmichael (1988) understands the university as an internal labor market whose e¢ ciency may be plagued by asymmetric information. Given an exogenous budget constraint, the university always wants to select the most competent employees. Thanks to knowledge specialization, the university has to delegate the enrollment tasks to the incumbent professors who have more expertise for estimating the academic prospect of the candidates. However, without occupational protection, the incumbents will be inclined to enroll those less competent than themselves to minimize the potential threat to their position. In this vein, Carmichael argues that the main function of academic tenure is supply the incumbent professor with "right" incentive to enroll new employees by o¤ering full occupational protection to them. Quite plausible as it seems, this story is still not enough to justify academic tenure. Indeed, if the main motivation of introducing tenure system is to correct incumbents' enrollment incentive, why will the universities not peg the new employees'performance to the incumbents'compensation?
The above literature only analyze the not-…re-employee feature of tenure system, but omit its up-or-out feature. However, in practice an assistant professor often faces an up-or-out contract under which he will be …red if he can not ful…l the predetermined academic criteria by the end of the probational period. Kahn and Huberman (1988) justi…es the "up-or-out" contract when the employer-employee relationship is characteristic of double moral hazard. Consider a simple two-period model. In the …rst period, the employee determines whether to make a costly investment to accumulate speci…c human capital. If he does invest, he is more likely to have a high productivity in the second period in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Here double moral hazard means that only the employee knows whether he has made the investment period while only the employer observes the employee's productivity in the second period (say, due to team work). To be meaningful, the investment is socially desirable. However, since in the second period the realization of the employee's productivity can be either high or low, the employer will always have incentive to claim low productivity and pay low wage if the employee can not be …red for low productivity. With rational expectation, the employee will have no incentive to invest in the …rst period. This is an ine¢ cient outcome. However, if the employee can be …red in the second period, the employer will be able to make a credible commitment that any employee, if not …red, should be paid high wage. Clearly, the employees with realized high productivity will be retained. In this scenario, the employees are also willing to make investment in the …rst period. Although Kahn and Huberman emphasized human capital speci…city, Waldman (1990) shows that their insight are quite general, still holding as long as the incumbent employer can observe the employee's productivity earlier than potential employers, i.e., when there is a time lag for informational di¤usion. Since human capital in higher education is highly general, Waldman's (1990) model actually provides an important rationale of tenure system with up-or-out contract. However, since the key to the double moral hazard story is that the university can …re the employees with low productivity, one may wonder why the universities will totally give up the option to …re the tenured professors, which may be very costly when there is productivity ‡uctuation of the professors doing research in the future.
Although the existing literature has shed light on tenure system from di¤er-ent perspectives, there are still some open problems. As suggested above, either they neglect to discuss the up-or-out dimension of tenure system, or they fail to explain why the universities will voluntarily give up the right to …re its employees in an once-for-all way. Having these in mind, this paper tries to propose a novel rationale to academic tenure system, highlighting that it might be important for the universities to solve the interwoven problems of multi-task incentive and ability screening in the process of enrollment. More concretely, we put two questions: Firstly, why would the universities like to adopt a tenure system voluntarily? and secondly, conditional on that the universities will have tenure system, what is the best way for them to o¤er tenure position to candidates whose ability is private information?
Our answer to the …rst problem is a direct application of Holmstrom and Milgrom's (1991) classic analysis on multi-task incentive. The university is a locale for knowledge production and dissemination. Consequentially, professors have two main tasks, teaching and research, both of which should be incentivized. Given there are many academic journals publicly available and ranking di¤erently, designing a performance-dependent incentive contract for researching activity seems quite simple. Say, the university can just count how many articles one teacher has published, while putting feasible weights on journal rankings and impact factors.
By contrast, it is very di¢ cult to estimate a professor's teaching performance. One di¢ culty arises from the inherent double moral hazard problem in the process of knowledge dissemination in which "teaching" performance depends not only on the teaching e¤ort at the teachers'side but also on the absorbing e¤ort at the students'side (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005) . Even when a bad teaching performance is observed, it is not clear which party, either the teacher or the students, is to blame. Another di¢ culty comes from the fact that teachers in universities are often self-estimated. This implies that student score is not a good proxy for teaching performance. If ever used, it must lead to score "in ‡ation". 1 Finally, we should emphasize that, the teaching service obtained as a package by the students in universities is, in essence, like a public good supplied by several individual teachers. Therefore, it is not easy to attribute good or bad performance to one speci…c teacher. This is especially true if we take into consideration the long time for full revelation of the reaching performance.
To simplify, we assumes that research performance is measurable while teaching performance is not. Since any implementable contract should be made on some observable and veri…able signals, this arouses truly serious problems for universities to incentive teaching and research at the same time. Typically, a high-powered incentive contract on observable academic performance must be at the expense of teaching incentive, which might not accord to the interest of the universities. Thus, according to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , the only way to "incentivize" teaching activity is to decrease the incentive power to researching activity. In our opinion, this explains why professors often have …xed wages largely independent on their after-tenure academic performance. Furthermore, the tenured professors should not be …red even when their after-tenure academic performance is unsatisfactory. Otherwise, the …xed-wage compensation together with conditional …ring is actually a high-powered incentive mechanism rather than a low-powered one. Or in Lazear's (2000) terminology, it is a discontinuous incentive mechanism. As it is clear now, giving up the option to …re tenured professors can be understood as a credible commitment from the university to "incentivize" teaching activities whose performance is hard to observe and estimate.
Based on our justi…cation of tenure system, the paper is focused on how the university should o¤er tenure contract when the productivity or ability of the candidates are their private information. More concretely, should the university directly o¤er a tenure contract to the candidates with a …xed wage, or should it o¤ers an up-or-out contract with a probational period and predetermined academic criterion?
From the viewpoint of multi-tasking incentive, the university should o¤er tenure position directly to professors such that they will have "right" incentive for teaching activity. However, this kind of direct tenure contract confronts serious adverse selection. Given candidates with high ability have better outside option and occupational positions in university are scare, direct tenure contract leads to a dilemma for the university between rent extraction and e¢ ciency. By o¤ering a direct tenure contract with high wage satisfying the high-ability candidates'participation constraint, the university will transfer information rents to the low-ability candidates. By o¤ering a direct tenure contract with low wage just satisfying the low-ability candidates'participation constraint, the university will su¤er from occupational vacancy.
The main point of this paper is that, when multi-tasking incentive is mingled with ability screening in the process of enrollment, an up-or-out tenure contract is a potential way out for the university. Only if a candidate meets the predetermined academic criterion in probational period, can he be granted tenured position. If there is a monotonicity relationship between ability and academic performance, this contract will have the e¤ect of screening the candidates. Meanwhile, the tenured professors have "right" incentive for teaching activity since they get …xed-wage compensation and can not …red in case of bad academic performance.
Section II is the basic model, in which research performance can be perfectly measured. Since a candidate's ability is either high or low, we consider three scenarios of employment: the …rst is direct tenure contract with low wage, the second is direct contract with high wage, the third is up-or-out contract with a probational period and a predetermined academic criteria for promotion. By comparison between these three scenarios, we obtain the best the employment contract. We also do comparative static analysis. When academic performance can be perfectly measured, the optimal up-or-out contract may lead to …rst-best allocation if the ability di¤erence between candidates is small. Although, in this case, the optimal up-or-out contract always dominates the low-wage direct tenure contract, it results in distortion and will be dominated by highwage direct tenure contract when the ability di¤erence is very large and the candidate is most likely to have high ability. Finally, as we shall show in the extended model in section III, the up-or-out contract will be dominated by a low-wage direct tenure contract when the academic performance can not be perfectly measured and the candidate is most likely to have low ability. Section IV concludes.
Basic Model

Model Setting
Consider a representative university. For expositional convenience, one employee of the university is simply called a "teacher" when it is unclear whether he has obtained tenure position. A potential employee is called a candidate. A teacher who has obtained tenure position is called a tenured professor. A teacher who has not obtained tenure position is called an assistant professor.
Every teacher has two tasks, i.e., research (task 1) and teaching (task 2). Both the university and the candidates are long-lived, risk neutral. They aim to maximize respective pro…ts. Time is discrete with discount factor < 1: Following Siow (1998), the vacant position in the university are scare. Without loss of generality, there is only one vacant position left for candidates. Each period enters only one candidate, having either high ability ( ) or low-ability ( ), with probability v and 1 v respectively. The candidate knows exactly his type, but the university only knows v: Any time, if one candidate is not employed or has been …red by the university, he exits forever, thereafter working in a competitive market with net payment c; where and c > 1 can be understood as the corresponding output and cost.
Consider the contract for a candidate : If he exerts e¤ort x i on task i (= 1; 2), his output in task i is
This assumption has two implications. On the one hand, for a speci…c teacher, the marginal contribution of teaching and researching e¤ort is the same; on the other hand, with same e¤ort, a teacher with higher ability will have a larger contribution. However, as argued before, only academic performance q 1 = x 1 can be observed and used for contract design. As a convention, when one variable has upper bar (or lower bar), it is related to type (or ):
It is important how to characterize the multi-task cost. Teaching and researching may be complementary. For example, the fruits of research can be used as teaching materials, hence decreasing the preparation cost of teaching. On the contrary, as an interaction between teachers and students, teaching activity may help teachers to …nd excellent research assistants, and hence decreasing the researching cost. However, teaching and research can also be substitutes. Besides direct crowding-out e¤ect of time, frequent transformation between different tasks may incur some extra cost. No matter teaching or research, it may need continuous attention or meditation. Stopping on half way often entails duplication cost. To synthesize both possibilities, we assume that, if a teacher exerts e¤ort x i on task i; then his multi-task cost is
where 2 [ 2; 2] characterizes the relationship between teaching and researching. They are complementary if < 0 but substitutes if > 0:
In this paper, our focus is not on the overall e¤ort of a teacher. Instead, by assuming that a teacher's overall time (e¤ort) is …xed, we want to see how a teacher will allocate his …xed time across teaching and researching activities under di¤erent employment contract. Without loss of generality, we normalize the overall time to 1:
Substituting (3) into (2), the multi-task cost becomes:
where we de…ne x x 1 for national convenience.
That is, C(x) is a parabola curve opening upwards. De…ne
Clearly, with inelastic overall time assumption, we simplify the multi-task problem to a single-task one. But is it meaningful to make this assumption? We want to say that this assumption, in essence, is consistent with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in which the marginal e¤ort cost of the agent is assumed to be negative when the e¤ort is below a threshold, and then increases when e¤ort increases. The reason that they make this assumption is to guarantee that the agent has incentive to exert some e¤ort under a …xed-wage contract. So is true for our paper.
Before going to market outcome, we …rst consider the …rst-best allocation. Obviously, for each candidate, whether high-or low-ability, once employed by the university, his contribution to social welfare, net opportunity cost, is
Noting C(x) < 1; the technical assumption c > 1 implies that there should be no positional vacancy in the university since the social bene…t from the candidate working in university is higher than in other competitive lines. Further noting that C(x) is minimized when x = 1=2; a candidate, once employed by the university, should spend equal time on teaching and researching activities.
Proposition 1 Under …rst-best outcome, there should be positional vacancy and the …xed time should be equally allocated to teaching and researching.
Market Equilibrium
We want to discuss what is the best way for the university to o¤er tenure contract. As told before, there are three possibilities, the low-wage direct tenure, the high-wage direct tenure contract and the up-or-out tenure contract.
The timing is as follows: The university …rst o¤ers one kind of tenure contract which a candidate can accept or reject it. In case of acceptance, the teacher chooses how to allocate the …xed time across teaching and researching activities. Then the contract is implemented. If the scare position is still vacant (maybe, it is because the candidate reject the o¤er or because the university has just …red an unquali…ed assistant professor), then the game starts again in the next period; otherwise, the game is over since all the position in the university have been …lled with tenured professors.
Direct Tenure Contract
Since a candidate may be low-or high-ability. There are two options for direct tenure contract. If the university o¤ers the direct tenure contract with high wage w such that
the high-ability candidate will accept it since (7) is just his participation constraint Of course, will also be happy to accept this o¤er, with current rent in each period. As both both types will accept this contract, the vacant position is …lled since the …rst period by tenured professors who, in turn, will choose the time allocation plan that minimizes multi-task cost. After discounting, the total bene…t of the university from this contract is
If the university o¤ers the direct tenure contract with low wage w such that
then only will accept this o¤er and then chooses time allocation plan that minimizes multi-task cost. Therefore, if the candidate is (with probability 1 v); the vacant position will be …lled afterwards. However, if the candidate is (the probability is v), he will reject the o¤er and the position keeps vacant, the game going to the next period. After discounting, the total bene…t of the university from this contract is
Up-or-Out Contract
With direct tenure contract, the university faces such a dilemma, either suffering from possible positional vacancy when the wage is low or transferring informational rents to low-ability candidate when the wage is high. An up-orout tenure contract may be a way out. We denote an up-or-out contract to be a triple fw n ; w t ; Rg;where w n is the …xed wage for assistant professor in probational period, w t is the …xed wage for tenured professor all the life, and R is the academic criterion for promotion. Sometimes, without confusion, we also call the up-or-contract R: Depending on the type di¤erence, we consider the up-or-out contract in the following cases.
2
In this case, the type di¤erence is very big. Even when chooses his costminimizing time allocation x = 1=2 and spends all his time on researching activity, 's academic performance ( ) is still less than 's ( =2): With these observations, the optimal up-or-out tenure contract can be easily characterized by the following conditions:
Under this up-or-out tenure contract, the university's net bene…t is
Note that K j (j = I; II; III) are all continuous in v: Note further that
We get the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If > 2 ; then the up-or-out contract always dominates the direct tenure contracts, and leads to …rst-best outcome.
This proposition shows that, if the candidate's type di¤erence is very big, then the up-or-out tenure contract characterized by (11) through (14) is the best tenure contract for the university. It is quite intuitive. By (12) (with equality), the rent of high-ability candidate is zero; by (13), the rent of low-ability candidate is also suppressed to zero. As a result, the up-or-out contract not only extracts all the information rent of the low-ability candidate (compared to high-wage direct tenure contract), but also avoids positional vacancy(compared to low-wage direct tenure contract). Clearly, this up-or-out contract results in e¤ort distortion as well.
< 2
Now the type di¤erence is not so large as before. If the university still sets academic criterion R = =2; can meet this criterion if he distorts his researching e¤ort upwards to R = < 1: If this does happen, there will be no screening. On the contrary, if the university wants full screening, it can simply set an academic criterion R = which will never succeed to ful…l. However, when academic criterion is R = ; 's optimal e¤ort in probational period should be = ; larger than 1=2; the cost-minimizing (also the socially optimal) e¤ort. We want to ask whether the university can …nd an academic criterion b R 2 ( =2; ) that also ful…lls perfect screening with less distortion than R = :
Suppose that the university has set a criterion b R 2 ( =2; ); under which promotion entails the research e¤ort b x = b R= for and b x = b R= for in the probational period. Since b x > b x > 1=2, neither nor would like to choose higher research e¤ort for promotion. Therefore, if some b R 2 ( =2; ) can lead to perfect screening, it must be the case that it is better for to choose 1=2 than b x: Based on above analysis, a separating equilibrium b R 2 ( =2; ) (if any) can be characterized by the following conditions:
( does not mimick (18)
For above conditions, only (20) needs further explanation. It means that if the university sets the academic criterion R ; then will have incentive to mimick. This condition is essential to welfare analysis and comparative statics later. Indeed, if this condition is violated, the university's bene…t under up-orout contract is still K III ; hence always dominating the direct tenure contracts. Using (16), (18) is equivalent to
which in turn implies that the key to equilibrium b R is: the right side of (19) should be larger than the right side of (21). Using the fact that b
Substituting the concrete form of C(x) into (22) and taking equality, (22) becomes . chooses x = 1=2 in probational period but then gets …red, going to competitive industry. With a little algebraic calculation, under this up-or-out tenure contract, the university gets expected pro…t
However, there are more intuitive way to get(24). Note that does not distort his e¤ort and neither type gets positive rent. Suppose for the moment that also does not distort his e¤ort. Then the university's pro…t will be : Now what remains is to subtract 's distortion loss in probational period. Noting that the distortion occurs in the next period only if the current assistant professor is ; the expected distortion loss is
Case II:
In this case, the equilibrium b R 2 ( =2; ) characterized by (18) through (20) does not exist. However, the university can simply set the academic criterion e R = to implement perfect screening equilibrium. In this equilibrium, chooses research e¤ort e x = = in probational period, then gets tenure position and chooses x = 1=2 forever. chooses x = 1=2 in probational period but then get …red going to competitive industry. Like (24), in this equilibrium, the university gets expected pro…t
There also exists a unique e v such that K Figure ( ??) illustrates the university's payo¤ when < 2 : Figure 1 : Comparison between up-or-out contract and direct tenure contracts when academic performance can be perfectly measured.
Proposition 3 When
2 , the optimal up-or-out contract still dominates low-wage direct tenure contract. However, if v is very large (v > b v in equilibrium b R 2 ( =2; ); v > e v in equilibrium e R = ), then the optimal up-or-out contract will be dominated by high-wage direct tenure contract. None of the tenure contracts can realize …rst-best outcome.
Everyday experience tells us that it is di¢ cult to distinguish two things with tiny di¤erence. Or to tell the di¤erence between them is very costly. Similarly, when the type di¤erence of the candidate is very small, the up-orout contract will inevitably result in e¢ ciency loss even it can still implement perfect screening given academic performance is perfectly observed. When the candidate is unlikely to be low ability type, the social value of screening is very small, and hence the up-or-out contract will be dominated by the high-wage direct tenure contract. The reason that the up-or-out contract still dominates low-wage direct contract is that it does not lead to distortion but can suppress informational rents when the candidate is low-ability type.
Comparative Statics
Now we consider the e¤ects of parameters and on the optimal contract choice. According to model setting, characterizes the multi-task cost. When is larger, teaching and research activities are more likely to be substitutes, or the complementarity between them decreases. Furthermore, when is bigger, the future bene…t is more important, which in some sense represents a shorter probational period.
Note that the equilibrium e v is determined by
From this equation, the implicit function theorem immediately leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 @e v=@ > 0; @e v=@ > 0
The results are very intuitive. In the equilibrium e R = ; e x = = ; 's research e¤ort in probational period, depends neither on nor on : So, ceteris paribus, a bigger implies that the university can screen the candidate in a shorter time, which necessarily increases the attractiveness of up-or-out contract. Furthermore, referring to (25) and (26), a larger means that C e x C m = (2 )( e x   1 2 ) 2 is smaller. That is, compared to the high-wage direct tenure contract, 's e¤ort distortion in probational period is smaller, which necessarily increases the attractiveness of up-or-out contract.
Relatively, the comparative statics of b v is a little more complicated. Like e v, b v is determined by
However, now b x is endogenously determined by (23). As a result, we must combine (28) with (23) to see how the parameters a¤ect e v:
Proposition 5 @b v=@ < 0; @b v=@ < 0:
Proof. Together with (28) and (23), we de…ne an implicit function
from which we immediately have > 0: Thus, we have
Based on above analysis, the implicit function theorem immediately implies that Compared to e v; the equilibrium b v has two remarkable characteristics. First, as we have mentioned, parameters and not only have direct e¤ect on e v in (29), but also have indirect e¤ect on e v through b x which is endogenously determined by (23), hence directly dependent on parameters and : Second, and should not be too large to satisfy (2 )(1 ) > 2 = ; the condition for this case to be true. With these observations and referring to (18), we know that when becomes larger, ceteris paribus, will have stronger incentive to mimick : Put in another word, for perfect screening, now the the university should correspondingly increase the academic criterion, but this exacerbates 's e¤ort distortion in probational period. Since has no rents, this distortion will be burdened by the university in the end. This implies that up-or-out contract becomes less attractive. By contrast, in equilibrium e v; can not mimick ; so a slight change of does not increase e¤ort distortion.
Similarly, when increases, will have more incentive to mimick since
Extension
In above analysis, we discuss how the university should o¤er tenure contract under the assumption that academic performance can be perfectly measured. Two results are worthwhile mentioning again. First, the up-or-out contract always dominates the low-wage direct tenure contract; second, the up-or-out contract, once employed, always realizes perfect screening. In this extension, we want to see whether these results will be changed if we introduce measurement error for academic performance.
To this aim, now we assume that the observed academic performance of teacher is
which depends not only on his ability and research e¤ort x, but also on random shock ": To simplify, we assume that " is iid in each period, following a normal H(:) with mean 0 and not correlated with : Except for introducing "; other model setting is the same as before. Since both the university and candidates are risk neutral, introducing this random shock does not change the direct tenure contracts. Now denote the up-or-out contract in question to be R # ; w n ; w t : If both and accept this contract, and choose x and x in probational period, then gets tenure position with probability
and with probability
Because a cumulative distribution function is always nondecreasing, then for any x and R # ; there must be
that is, P (x; R # ) is a …rst-order stochastic dominance to P (x; R # ). If accepts contract R # ; w n ; w t ; he will choose his e¤ort x to maximize his expected bene…t:
where the …rst two terms represent 's bene…ts in probational period, the third term represents his discounted present bene…ts since after obtaining tenure position, and the fourth term represents the present value of his bene…t in outside competitive market if he fails to get tenure position. The …rst-order condition for the program is
Similarly, if accepts contract R # ; w n ; w t ;he will choose x to maximize his expected pro…ts
and the corresponding …rst order condition is
Denote the results of the two programs above to be x # and x # ; and P and P # : Note that, under the normal distribution assumption, P # and P # are strictly positive. Now we characterize the conditions for the contract R # ; w n ; w t : 's ex ante participation constraint is
's ex ante participation constraint is
's interior participation constraint is
Clearly, if possible, will necessarily accept the tenure o¤er.
Lemma 1 x # > 1=2: That is, will distort upwards the research e¤ ort in probational period. This proposition is a direct corollary of the above lemma. As it is clear, given that the measurement error follows a normal distribution with mean zero and …nite variance, facing the up-or-out tenure contract will distort upwards his research e¤ort in probational period for a larger promotion probability. For the tenure wage w t satisfying 's interior participation constraint (40) is very attractive. However, when v is very small, i.e., when the candidate is most likely to be ; this distortion e¤ect from the up-or-out contract will dominate its bene…t from avoiding vocational vacancy. By contrast, in this case, the lowwage direct tenure contract results in no distortion of although the university may indeed su¤er from vocational vacancy when the candidate proves to be : But as it is assumed, this expected loss is very small when v is very small.
De…nition 1
The up-or-out contract R # ; w n ; w t implements e¤ ective screening in the sense of probability if it leads to P # P # .
Here we say it is an e¢ cient screening in the sense of probability because once employed will have a positive probability to get the tenure position. This is a very important di¤erence with the perfect screening case, which, of course, can be seen as a special case with zero measurement error.
Proposition 7
Assume " follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 2 : If 2 ! 1; the up-or-out contract R # ; w n ; w t characterized above implements e¤ ective screening in the sense of probability. Furthermore, it realizes the …rst-best outcome unless there is a binding minimum-wage restriction.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary contract R # ; w n ; w t : 's promotion probability
Then the …rst order conditions (35) and (37) immediately imply that both types will choose socially optimal e¤ort allocation, i.e., x # ! 1=2 and x # ! 1=2; which, by the …rst-order stochastic dominance, in turn, imply P # > P # ; the e¤ective screening in the sense of probability. Then, combining two participation constraints (38) and (39) taking equality, we get
where all terms are independent on w n : Note that the right side of (41) is positive, and P # P # > 0; then there must exist a unique w t such that (41) holds. Note further that 's interior participation constraint is strictly satis…ed, i.e., w t C m > c: Finally, substituting the w t determined in (41) back to (38) or (39), we can get the unique corresponding w n : At …rst glance, this proposition seems astonishing since it implies that extreme measurement error will improve e¢ ciency. However, this is reasonable. If measurement error of academic performance tends to in…nity, the bene…t of the candidate by distorting research e¤ort in probational period tends to zero since it will not increase his probability of being promotion to tenure position. So no e¤ort distortion arises. Insofar as 's interior participation constraint is strictly satis…ed, the university actually "rewards" the tenured professors. Because has less valuable outside option, his actual reward, if promoted to tenure position, is larger. However, with same e¤ort x, P (x; R # ) < P (x; R # ); so is also less likely to be promoted. Adjusted by opportunity cost and promotion probability, the ex ante expected reward for both types is the same. As no term in (41) depends on w n , the university can then choose a low w n to "punish" the candidate in the probational period taking away all the rents if there is no minimum wage restriction. In this sense, minimum wage policy may decrease the attractiveness of up-or-out contract to the university. Put in another word, given the university o¤ers an up-or-out contract, the minimum wage policy probably restricts the freedom of its rent-extraction, and hence protecting the teachers. This implication is consistent to Freeman's (1977) analysis on minimum wage policy as a insurance mechanism to professors under tenure system.
Concluding Remarks
The university can be seen as an economic organization that produces and sells knowledge. Consequentially, the professors produce knowledge by researching activity while instructing knowledge by teaching activity. In long term, research and teaching activities are equally important for the university. Therefore, both need to be incentivized. However, designing a multi-task incentive contract has essential di¢ culty when one task, teaching activity in this paper, is immeasurable. In this case, by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , the only way to incentive teaching activity is to decrease the incentive power to the measurable researching activity. As such, we justify the low-powered contract for tenure professors from the multi-task perspective. However, multi-tasking is not the only problem facing the university. It also want to select able employees while extracting the informational rents. For this aim, the low-powered contract performs badly. Typically, when the candidates have their abilities as private information, the university faces a dilemma by using a direct tenure contract, either transferring informational rents to the candidate with low ability, or su¤ering from vocational vacancy. This paper shows that an up-or-out tenure contract may be a solution to this dilemma.
Finally, we think that the tenure system is a very complicated institution. Perhaps no single insight is enough for its justi…cation. In this sense, our explanation is complementary to the existing literature on academic tenure system.
